NACS

Margaret Tatcher about sovereignity

Naila Qalqili — Tue, 29 Sep 2026 19:02:09 +0000

1988 Sep 20 Tu

Margaret Thatcher

Speech to the College of Europe ("The Bruges Speech")

Prime Minister

Prime Minister, Rector, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen:

First, may I thank you for giving me the opportunity to return to Bruges and in very different circumstances from my last visit shortly after the Zeebrugge Ferry disaster, when Belgian courage and the devotion of your doctors and nurses saved so many British lives.

And second, may I say what a pleasure it is to speak at the College of Europe under the distinguished leadership of its Professor LukaszewskiRector.

The College plays a vital and increasingly important part in the life of the European Community.

And third, may I also thank you for inviting me to deliver my address in this magnificent hall.

What better place to speak of Europe's future than a building which so gloriously recalls the greatness that Europe had already achieved over 600 years ago.

Your city of Bruges has many other historical associations for us in Britain. Geoffrey Chaucer was a frequent visitor here.

And the first book to be printed in the English language was produced here in Bruges by William Caxton.

BRITAIN AND EUROPE

Mr. Chairman, you have invited me to speak on the subject of Britain and Europe. Perhaps I should congratulate you on your courage.

If you believe some of the things said and written about my views on Europe, it must seem rather like inviting Genghis Khan to speak on the virtues of peaceful coexistence!

I want to start by disposing of some myths about my country, Britain, and its relationship with Europe and to do that, I must say something about the identity of Europe itself.

Europe is not the creation of the Treaty of Rome.

Nor is the European idea the property of any group or institution.

We British are as much heirs to the legacy of European culture as any other nation. Our links to the rest of Europe, the continent of Europe, have been the dominant factor in our history.

For three hundred years, we were part of the Roman Empire and our maps still trace the straight lines of the roads the Romans built.

Our ancestors—Celts, Saxons, Danes—came from the Continent. [end p1]

Our nation was—in that favourite Community word— “restructured” under the Norman and Angevin rule in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

This year, we celebrate the three hundredth anniversary of the glorious revolution in which the British crown passed to Prince William of Orange and Queen Mary.

Visit the great churches and cathedrals of Britain, read our literature and listen to our language: all bear witness to the cultural riches which we have drawn from Europe and other Europeans from us.

We in Britain are rightly proud of the way in which, since Magna Carta in the year 1215, we have pioneered and developed representative institutions to stand as bastions of freedom.

And proud too of the way in which for centuries Britain was a home for people from the rest of Europe who sought sanctuary from tyranny.

But we know that without the European legacy of political ideas we could not have achieved as much as we did.

From classical and mediaeval thought we have borrowed that concept of the rule of law which marks out a civilised society from barbarism.

And on that idea of Christendom, to which the Rector referred—Christendom for long synonymous with Europe—with its recognition of the unique and spiritual nature of the individual, on that idea, we still base our belief in personal liberty and other human rights.

Too often, the history of Europe is described as a series of interminable wars and quarrels.

Yet from our perspective today surely what strikes us most is our common experience. For instance, the story of how Europeans explored and colonised—and yes, without apology—civilised much of the world is an extraordinary tale of talent, skill and courage.

But we British have in a very special way contributed to Europe.

Over the centuries we have fought to prevent Europe from falling under the dominance of a single power.

We have fought and we have died for her freedom.

Only miles from here, in Belgium, lie the bodies of 120,000 British soldiers who died in the First World War.

Had it not been for that willingness to fight and to die, Europe would have been united long before now—but not in liberty, not in justice.

It was British support to resistance movements throughout the last War that helped to keep alive the flame of liberty in so many countries until the day of liberation.

Tomorrow, King Baudouin will attend a service in Brussels to commemorate the many brave Belgians who gave their lives in service with the Royal Air Force—a sacrifice which we shall never forget.

And it was from our island fortress that the liberation of Europe itself was mounted.

And still, today, we stand together.

Nearly 70,000 British servicemen are stationed on the mainland of Europe.

All these things alone are proof of our commitment to Europe's future. [end p2]

The European Community is one manifestation of that European identity, but it is not the only one.

We must never forget that east of the Iron Curtain, people who once enjoyed a full share of European culture, freedom and identity have been cut off from their roots.

We shall always look on Warsaw, Prague and Budapest as great European cities.

Nor should we forget that European values have helped to make the United States of America into the valiant defender of freedom which she has become.

EUROPE'S FUTURE

This is no arid chronicle of obscure facts from the dust-filled libraries of history.

It is the record of nearly two thousand years of British involvement in Europe, cooperation with Europe and contribution to Europe, contribution which today is as valid and as strong as ever [sic].

Yes, we have looked also to wider horizons—as have others—and thank goodness for that, because Europe never would have prospered and never will prosper as a narrow-minded, inward-looking club.

The European Community belongs to all its members.

It must reflect the traditions and aspirations of all its members.

And let me be quite clear.

Britain does not dream of some cosy, isolated existence on the fringes of the European Community. Our destiny is in Europe, as part of the Community.

That is not to say that our future lies only in Europe, but nor does that of France or Spain or, indeed, of any other member.

The Community is not an end in itself.

Nor is it an institutional device to be constantly modified according to the dictates of some abstract intellectual concept.

Nor must it be ossified by endless regulation.

The European Community is a practical means by which Europe can ensure the future prosperity and security of its people in a world in which there are many other powerful nations and groups of nations.

We Europeans cannot afford to waste our energies on internal disputes or arcane institutional debates.

They are no substitute for effective action.

Europe has to be ready both to contribute in full measure to its own security and to compete commercially and industrially in a world in which success goes to the countries which encourage individual initiative and enterprise, rather than those which attempt to diminish them.

This evening I want to set out some guiding principles for the future which I believe will ensure that Europe does succeed, not just in economic and defence terms but also in the quality of life and the influence of its peoples. [end p3]

WILLING COOPERATION BETWEEN SOVEREIGN STATES

My first guiding principle is this: willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community.

To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardise the objectives we seek to achieve.

Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality.

Some of the founding fathers of the Community thought that the United States of America might be its model.

But the whole history of America is quite different from Europe.

People went there to get away from the intolerance and constraints of life in Europe.

They sought liberty and opportunity; and their strong sense of purpose has, over two centuries, helped to create a new unity and pride in being American, just as our pride lies in being British or Belgian or Dutch or German.

I am the first to say that on many great issues the countries of Europe should try to speak with a single voice.

I want to see us work more closely on the things we can do better together than alone.

Europe is stronger when we do so, whether it be in trade, in defence or in our relations with the rest of the world.

But working more closely together does not require power to be centralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy.

Indeed, it is ironic that just when those countries such as the Soviet Union, which have tried to run everything from the centre, are learning that success depends on dispersing power and decisions away from the centre, there are some in the Community who seem to want to move in the opposite direction.

We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.

Certainly we want to see Europe more united and with a greater sense of common purpose.

But it must be in a way which preserves the different traditions, parliamentary powers and sense of national pride in one's own country; for these have been the source of Europe's vitality through the centuries.

ENCOURAGING CHANGE

My second guiding principle is this: Community policies must tackle present problems in a practical way, however difficult that may be.

If we cannot reform those Community policies which are patently wrong or ineffective and which are rightly causing public disquiet, then we shall not get the public support for the Community's future development.

And that is why the achievements of the European Council in Brussels last February are so important. [end p4]

It was not right that half the total Community budget was being spent on storing and disposing of surplus food.

Now those stocks are being sharply reduced.

It was absolutely right to decide that agriculture's share of the budget should be cut in order to free resources for other policies, such as helping the less well-off regions and helping training for jobs.

It was right too to introduce tighter budgetary discipline to enforce these decisions and to bring the Community spending under better control.

And those who complained that the Community was spending so much time on financial detail missed the point. You cannot build on unsound foundations, financial or otherwise, and it was the fundamental reforms agreed last winter which paved the way for the remarkable progress which we have made since on the Single Market.

But we cannot rest on what we have achieved to date.

For example, the task of reforming the Common Agricultural Policy is far from complete.

Certainly, Europe needs a stable and efficient farming industry.

But the CAP has become unwieldy, inefficient and grossly expensive. Production of unwanted surpluses safeguards neither the income nor the future of farmers themselves.

We must continue to pursue policies which relate supply more closely to market requirements, and which will reduce over-production and limit costs.

Of course, we must protect the villages and rural areas which are such an important part of our national life, but not by the instrument of agricultural prices.

Tackling these problems requires political courage.

The Community will only damage itself in the eyes of its own people and the outside world if that courage is lacking.

EUROPE OPEN TO ENTERPRISE

My third guiding principle is the need for Community policies which encourage enterprise.

If Europe is to flourish and create the jobs of the future, enterprise is the key.

The basic framework is there: the Treaty of Rome itself was intended as a Charter for Economic Liberty.

But that it is not how it has always been read, still less applied.

The lesson of the economic history of Europe in the 70's and 80's is that central planning and detailed control do not work and that personal endeavour and initiative do.

That a State-controlled economy is a recipe for low growth and that free enterprise within a framework of law brings better results.

The aim of a Europe open to enterprise is the moving force behind the creation of the Single European Market in 1992. By getting rid of barriers, by making it possible for companies to operate on a European scale, we can best compete with the United States, Japan and other new economic powers emerging in Asia and elsewhere. [end p5]

And that means action to free markets, action to widenchoice, action to reduce government intervention.

Our aim should not be more and more detailed regulation from the centre: it should be to deregulate and to remove the constraints on trade.

Britain has been in the lead in opening its markets to others.

The City of London has long welcomed financial institutions from all over the world, which is why it is the biggest and most successful financial centre in Europe.

We have opened our market for telecommunications equipment, introduced competition into the market services and even into the network itself—steps which others in Europe are only now beginning to face.

In air transport, we have taken the lead in liberalisation and seen the benefits in cheaper fares and wider choice.

Our coastal shipping trade is open to the merchant navies of Europe.

We wish we could say the same of many other Community members.

Regarding monetary matters, let me say this. The key issue is not whether there should be a European Central Bank.

The immediate and practical requirements are:

to implement the Community's commitment to free movement of capital—in Britain, we have it;

and to the abolition through the Community of exchange controls—in Britain, we abolished them in 1979;

to establish a genuinely free market in financial services in banking, insurance, investment;

and to make greater use of the ecu.

This autumn, Britain is issuing ecu-denominated Treasury bills and hopes to see other Community governments increasingly do the same.

These are the real requirements because they are what the Community business and industry need if they are to compete effectively in the wider world.

And they are what the European consumer wants, for they will widen his choice and lower his costs.

It is to such basic practical steps that the Community's attention should be devoted.

When those have been achieved and sustained over a period of time, we shall be in a better position to judge the next move.

It is the same with frontiers between our countries.

Of course, we want to make it easier for goods to pass through frontiers.

Of course, we must make it easier for people to travel throughout the Community.

But it is a matter of plain common sense that we cannot totally abolish frontier controls if we are also to protect our citizens from crime and stop the movement of drugs, of terrorists and of illegal immigrants. [end p6]

That was underlined graphically only three weeks ago when one brave German customs officer, doing his duty on the frontier between Holland and Germany, struck a major blow against the terrorists of the IRA.

And before I leave the subject of a single market, may I say that we certainly do not need new regulations which raise the cost of employment and make Europe's labour market less flexible and less competitive with overseas suppliers.

If we are to have a European Company Statute, it should contain the minimum regulations.

And certainly we in Britain would fight attempts to introduce collectivism and corporatism at the European level—although what people wish to do in their own countries is a matter for them.

EUROPE OPEN TO THE WORLD

My fourth guiding principle is that Europe should not be protectionist.

The expansion of the world economy requires us to continue the process of removing barriers to trade, and to do so in the multilateral negotiations in the GATT.

It would be a betrayal if, while breaking down constraints on trade within Europe, the Community were to erect greater external protection.

We must ensure that our approach to world trade is consistent with the liberalisation we preach at home.

We have a responsibility to give a lead on this, a responsibility which is particularly directed towards the less developed countries.

They need not only aid; more than anything, they need improved trading opportunities if they are to gain the dignity of growing economic strength and independence.

EUROPE AND DEFENCE

My last guiding principle concerns the most fundamental issue—the European countries' role in defence.

Europe must continue to maintain a sure defence through NATO.

There can be no question of relaxing our efforts, even though it means taking difficult decisions and meeting heavy costs.

It is to NATO that we owe the peace that has been maintained over 40 years.

The fact is things are going our way: the democratic model of a free enterprise society has proved itself superior; freedom is on the offensive, a peaceful offensive the world over, for the first time in my life-time.

We must strive to maintain the United States' commitment to Europe's defence. And that means recognising the burden on their resources of the world role they undertake and their point that their allies should bear the full part of the defence of freedom, particularly as Europe grows wealthier.

Increasingly, they will look to Europe to play a part in out-of-area defence, as we have recently done in the Gulf.

NATO and the Western European Union have long recognised where the problems of Europe's defence lie, and have pointed out the solutions. And the time has come when we must give substance to our declarations about a strong defence effort with better value for money. [end p7]

It is not an institutional problem.

It is not a problem of drafting. It is something at once simpler and more profound: it is a question of political will and political courage, of convincing people in all our countries that we cannot rely for ever on others for our defence, but that each member of the Alliance must shoulder a fair share of the burden.

We must keep up public support for nuclear deterrence, remembering that obsolete weapons do not deter, hence the need for modernisation.

We must meet the requirements for effective conventional defence in Europe against Soviet forces which are constantly being modernised.

We should develop the WEU, not as an alternative to NATO, but as a means of strengthening Europe's contribution to the common defence of the West.

Above all, at a time of change and uncertainly in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we must preserve Europe's unity and resolve so that whatever may happen, our defence is sure.

At the same time, we must negotiate on arms control and keep the door wide open to cooperation on all the other issues covered by the Helsinki Accords.

But let us never forget that our way of life, our vision and all we hope to achieve, is secured not by the rightness of our cause but by the strength of our defence.

On this, we must never falter, never fail.

THE BRITISH APPROACH

Mr. Chairman, I believe it is not enough just to talk in general terms about a European vision or ideal.

If we believe in it, we must chart the way ahead and identify the next steps.

And that is what I have tried to do this evening.

This approach does not require new documents: they are all there, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Revised Brussels Treaty and the Treaty of Rome, texts written by far-sighted men, a remarkable Belgian—Paul Henri Spaak—among them.

However far we may want to go, the truth is that we can only get there one step at a time.

And what we need now is to take decisions on the next steps forward, rather than let ourselves be distracted by Utopian goals.

Utopia never comes, because we know we should not like it if it did.

Let Europe be a family of nations, understanding each other better, appreciating each other more, doing more together but relishing our national identity no less than our common European endeavour.

Let us have a Europe which plays its full part in the wider world, which looks outward not inward, and which preserves that Atlantic community—that Europe on both sides of the Atlantic—which is our noblest inheritance and our greatest strength.

May I thank you for the privilege of delivering this lecture in this great hall to this great college (applause).

Billionaire entrepreneur Andrey Melnichenko: The New World will be defined by sovereignty

Andrey Matuzov — Sat, 26 Sep 2026 19:23:21 +0000

Dimitri Simes: This is a special analytical edition of “The Great Game.” We will talk with Andrey Igorevich Melnichenko – a very successful entrepreneur. Like every successful entrepreneur of a large scale, he is under Western sanctions, the grounds for which I long ago stopped trying to understand. Recently, a major piece was devoted to him in the English magazine The Economist – a publication that is not known for its sympathies toward Russia. The article acknowledges that Andrey Igorevich is not an opponent of the Russian authorities and does not try to present himself as an opponent of the war. At the same time, he is spoken of with great respect – as a serious, thoughtful person and, as I want to add, a true patriot of Russia. In your interview and the article published in The Economist, you expressed, from my point of view, a whole series of reasonable thoughts about why the West should not try to inflict a defeat on Russia and how such attempts could harm the West itself. But we are primarily interested in the extent to which the West is capable of listening to reasonable arguments. What is required for your voice to be heard there and, more broadly, the voice of Russia? So far, I – as, it seems to me, both the Russian authorities and analysts like me – have the impression that we are heard, but at the same time they think only about how to refute and ignore our arguments. What is your impression?

Andrey Melnichenko: There is probably no simple answer here. Indeed, today Western elites in general treat Russia, to put it mildly, in an unfriendly manner. This, of course, imposes certain constraints. But should we try to change such an attitude? Are there any chances of changing it? I think the question should be posed differently. To force oneself to be understood or liked is not quite the right task. It is far more correct to change the balance of risks and interests that has developed between us and the West. It is precisely work on changing this balance that should be the goal of continuing dialogue through all available channels of communication.

Dimitri Simes: It seems to me that for a person like you, it is rather difficult to conduct a dialogue with European elites. You are a physicist, in your early youth you became a successful entrepreneur, an international businessman. You think logically and systematically, you analyze risks and opportunities. But a whole series of analysts, including me, have the impression that European elites easily depart from logic and even forget about their own interests. Russophobia prevents them from thinking rationally. What is your impression? Are these elites with whom it is even possible to conduct a real dialogue?

Andrey Melnichenko: I think that the notion of a “united West” does not exist. The West, like any complex society and any complex structure, is fragmented. It is divided in terms of various political and economic interests. It is a conglomeration of interests. The task is to understand these interests. To understand does not mean to conform to them. One must always proceed from one’s own interests. But by understanding the language of the interlocutor, one can, as I already said, change the balance of risks and interests. That is probably what one should be doing.

Dimitri Simes: From my point of view, this is a very rational thought. But you also noted in your interview and article for The Economist that in order for your arguments to be heard, it is necessary to convince the interlocutor of the ability to defend one’s own positions and of readiness to show firmness. On the other hand, you expressed concern that further escalation could lead to an expansion of the conflict and to the most unpleasant – possibly catastrophic – consequences. Yesterday I read a speech by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. He essentially repeats your thoughts: there is a real danger of escalation that probably no one wants and that no one needs. But such a danger exists, and it must be reckoned with. How, in your view, can one simultaneously demonstrate resolve and avoid dangerous escalation?

Andrey Melnichenko: If there were a simple answer, it would probably already have been found. But there is no simple answer here. It seems to me that the very structure of negotiations and dialogue must to a certain extent be changed. It should be looked at somewhat differently. What are classical structures of negotiations like? There is a deal, when the parties try to find benefit for each of them. There are negotiations in the course of which the parties seek compromises, the possibility of avoiding something or, on the contrary, finding something in common. But there also exists such a structure of conversation as a project. How does a project differ from the previous two types? In this case, the initial conditions – where you are – and the final goal are more or less clear. And the goal in this case is obvious: to find the possibility of coexistence in a new world that is becoming increasingly unsafe. It is precisely the word “project” that probably describes the method that should be used here. Negotiations are when you sit on opposite sides of the table and resolve your issues by comparing positions. And a project is when you sit on one side of the table, and on the other side is the problem. The solution to the problem may be unknown, but if it is formulated what exactly needs to be solved, and the two sides work together on this task, a solution, as a rule, is found. Sometimes it turns out to be the most unexpected.

Dimitri Simes: Provided that both sides are interested in finding a solution. When I read about you, familiarized myself with what you wrote, and listen to you now, I imagine that you could be very effective in a conversation with Henry Kissinger or Richard Nixon. But when I think about the current European elites, I am not sure about that. I never personally met Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, but I know that he was a man of great intellect and a true professional. Not only Kissinger, but also Nixon, as president, regularly met with him. I am trying to imagine Dobrynin talking with President Biden. And even more so Dobrynin in a conversation with Chancellor Merz. These are people of completely different intellect and completely different type. How does one deal with those who are not ready to seek constructive solutions, even if such a solution serves their interests?

Andrey Melnichenko: There are two formulas here. The first is to change the balance of risks and opportunities.

Dimitri Simes: But then the danger of escalation appears.

Andrey Melnichenko: The key word is “balance.” To go only in one direction, without taking the other into account, means destroying the balance. To seek balance is something else: to find certain solutions. You have just focused attention on the role of leaders — Biden, Nixon, and others. In the Russian and Western traditions there is a tendency to personify the activity of such large political subjects as the state, linking it to the actions of leaders. But that is not quite so. Society is far more complex. A leader far from always determines the course of history. To a certain extent, the archetype of a leader corresponds to the state of society at a particular moment. For example, in the Russian — or, more precisely, civilizational — tradition, the concept of a leader is connected with the concept of mission. There is a historical mission, and the leader must correspond to it. Therefore, in the Russian consciousness, the view of a leader is at the same time a view of mission. We reason within this system of coordinates. In the democratic societies of the West it may be somewhat different. Personification there is less pronounced, and society is more fragmented. If you see that your interlocutor does not hear you, two questions arise here. Of course, there is a question for the interlocutor: it is more pleasant to deal with someone who understands you, shares your values and views. It is far more difficult to find solutions in a world that has become fragmented, where various interests, civilizational codes, and perceptions exist. But this is precisely the work that must be done.

Dimitri Simes: I can imagine your conversation with President Trump. He is, of course, a special person: self-absorbed, sometimes capricious, he likes to be unpredictable. But, like you, he has extensive experience in business. He understands: if a deal serves your interests, you need to seek creative solutions and a balance of interests. Therefore I can see how Trump often makes broad statements, sometimes issues threats in caricatured form. But in the end he understands that certain things cannot be done, and certain things must be done. This has led to a situation where, despite the fundamental and enduring contradictions between Moscow and Washington, the presidents of the two countries conduct a serious dialogue. It seems to me that Trump treats Vladimir Putin with respect. And I am sure that Putin treats Trump with respect and understanding — with open eyes regarding whose interests Trump represents and what can be expected from him. Putin behaves like a rational leader. But when I look at European leaders, I am not sure how far one can rely on them following Karl Marx’s formula: being determines consciousness. It seems to me that their consciousness is often disconnected from being. You rightly said that one should not focus too much on leaders: the real decision-making mechanisms in European countries are significantly more complex. But how does one understand the colossal sanctions imposed against Russia, especially in the energy sphere and, in particular, against Russian gas? It would seem that both for the population of Germany and for German business circles, Russia was a quite reliable partner. I, at least, have not seen complaints from German businessmen or consumers about how Russia acted as an economic partner of Germany. And all of this was so easily cast aside. Why?

Andrey Melnichenko: Because the world is more complex. Everything does not come down to a deal and economic benefit. If we speak about political processes in Europe as I understand them, society there is changing very quickly. Technologies are changing, the speed of information dissemination, the nature of challenges. All of this is happening extremely quickly. When changes happen quickly, uncertainty, fragmentation, and nervousness arise in society. A need appears to simplify what is happening, to find some explanation for it. One of the simplest ways is to find an image of an enemy, an external enemy. Such an image allows society to be consolidated and internal contradictions to be held in check. Unfortunately, in the perception of a number of European countries, we have become such an enemy. Russia has turned into a convenient enemy for the elites of these societies — into an instrument for consolidating political unity. In my view, this is precisely what happened. This is a big problem, because in such a situation emotions defeat rationality. If we speak about the logic of President Trump, you indeed described him as a businessman. But there exist different ways of doing business. There is a method that Trump himself described in detail in the 1980s: creating imbalance. You create uncertainty in your opponent, demonstrate that he does not know what to expect from you, and thanks to this you extract benefit from the deal. This is not the only possible method of doing business, but it is a possible one. I am far more impressed by the approach that, for example, the Russian Federation adheres to. In my view, it corresponds more to an attempt to speak in the language of a project: to seek a solution to the problem and propose a structure that could answer the questions that arise. These are simply different approaches. We live in a world where economic globalization will not end. It is beneficial, and the economy continues to develop. The International Monetary Fund speaks of three percent growth of the world economy this year. Economic globalization continues. Goods still move along supply chains, perhaps more complex ones. But at the same time, political fragmentation has occurred. The existence of economic globalism does not mean the existence of a single political system. This is precisely what we today call a multipolar world. If the world is multipolar, one should not expect that others will be the same as we are. They will think and act in their own interests, proceeding from their own system of priorities. We must think about our interests and our system of priorities, and find a model of survival in this new, unsafe world. Moreover, what is at issue should be not simply survival, but development and movement forward. One should not force anyone to love you or understand you. One must clearly follow one’s own interests, understand them, and see further than one’s counterparts see. If there is an understanding of the goal and confidence in it, the road will lead to that goal one way or another.

Dimitri Simes: There is an English expression: “A tongue without arms — how dare you speak?” In other words, if you have no power or weapons, why do you even allow yourself to speak out? [Translator’s note: the Russian “язык без рук” is literally “a tongue without arms” — a voice with no force behind it; the host presents it as an English expression, though it is not idiomatic English.] It seems to me that this is precisely the dilemma of Russian foreign policy. If we create the impression that we genuinely threaten the United States, Europe, and the West, that impression is exploited to the maximum: they stir up their own populations, militarize their economies, and take various actions against Russia. But if we say, “Let’s return to international law. We live on one planet and face common threats. There was COVID, now artificial intelligence may spiral out of control, there are climate threats. Let’s tackle these problems together,” then I get the feeling that they hear us in a completely different way from what we mean. They hear that we are weak and indecisive. And that, in their view, contradicts their interests. You used the key word “balance.” As you know, that was Kissinger’s favorite word. But the Kissinger era in America is over. How does one seek balance in such a situation?

Andrey Melnichenko: Indeed, I would like to know. One needs to think about what the world will look like some time from now. It is on the threshold of great changes and is already going through them. We are moving toward a world in which political systems will be fragmented. Different systems will develop in accordance with their own codes and principles. In this world, one should not set as a goal to be fully understood. Nor should one deceive oneself with the illusion that one can precisely understand and account for the interests of all others. It seems to me that in the world we are entering—not because we want it, but because it is objectively becoming so—the key concept will be sovereignty. What does that mean? Above all, the ability to make decisions in one’s own interests. Russia has withstood. You mentioned sanctions and other measures of pressure. We have demonstrated the resilience of our political and economic systems despite everything that has come down on us. In that sense, security was ensured. But the next question is how to ensure security of development. How to make it so that we develop, so that the word “sovereignty” is filled with concrete content? Sovereignty is the ability to act in one’s own interests, to make decisions in the way that benefits you. What does “you” mean? It means giving citizens a planning horizon and a certain predictability. Secondly, ensuring the ability to develop technology, means of production, industry, and the education system. It is into domestic matters that sovereignty must be transformed. If you mind your own business and are interested in your own development, then everything else, including foreign policy, comes down to one question: how to ensure the conditions that allow you to pursue that development. That is the main goal of foreign policy.

Dimitri Simes: French President Emmanuel Macron recently said something that alarmed me greatly. He said that Russia represents an existential threat to Europe and, more specifically, to France. When people speak of existential threats, it is implied that even military action may be permitted to counter them—including preemptive action. If Macron really meant what he said, do you think that he and other European leaders are preparing for war with Russia? Not a war that Russia might start against them, but a war that they intend to start against Russia?

Andrey Melnichenko: Europe is militarizing—that is a fact. Military spending is growing, rhetoric is intensifying. This has become an important instrument for mobilizing Western European societies. The question is whether this fact will be transformed into a reality that in fact is needed neither by us nor by them. Preventing a negative scenario is our task.

Dimitri Simes: I very much like your manner of thinking—the constant search for balance. I want to ask another question. Under sanctions, Russia has found ways to uphold its sovereignty through self-sufficiency. It is impressive how our country manages this. But if one thinks about the long term, do you not fear that we will be able to solve specific tasks, especially in the area of weapons development, but that this will hinder development overall—not only in comparison with the United States, but also with China and India?

Andrey Melnichenko: Of course I fear it. It seems to me that total self-sufficiency and a fully autonomous system are not the solution. Here again one must seek balance. On the one hand, there is a bloc of critically important technologies and basic means of production. It is also important to control one’s own national payment system. There are areas in which you must be fully protected from any external influence. Either you need to have your own solutions, or several reliable suppliers. There must be several of them. That is one bloc. On the other hand, full self-sufficiency is not the solution. To be economically efficient and competitive, one must participate in the exchange of goods, technology, and knowledge. But at the same time, one must not create new dependencies. Thus, on the one hand, a balance of security in critically important areas is necessary, and on the other, sustainable development that does not create new dependencies. If this balance is maintained, that is the right path. If it is disrupted, problems arise: either risks grow, or development slows, which ultimately leads to falling behind developing countries.

Dimitri Simes: Under sanctions, it is especially important to preserve the right dynamics of economic growth, and this largely depends on investment. Investment, in turn, depends on the key rate. I don’t need to tell you this—you know it far better than I do: there is a direct link between economic growth rates and the preservation of fiscal stability. On this matter, opinions in Russia, including within the government, differ. What is your approach?

Andrey Melnichenko: What are we observing now? The global economy has not been destroyed by the two ongoing wars. The conflict in the Middle East has led to rising risks and costs in energy, maritime logistics, and insurance. The events related to the conflict in Ukraine launched a different phase—processes of fragmentation caused by sanctions and technological restrictions. The world economy has adapted to these changes, but it does so at the cost of rising expenses. Goods continue to move, but if previously a company needed only one supplier, now it needs three. Previously one could operate with minimal inventories on a just in time basis, but today one has to accumulate excess reserves. States also have to bear additional expenses and create backup systems to perform certain functions. In other words, costs are rising in the world economy, and the consequence of this is rising costs in national economies and inflation. This is cost-push inflation. When we begin to fight inflation without affecting production costs and expenses on the supply side, but instead use methods that were correct in a different economic situation, we encounter a problem. This is about a world that was open and fully global, without significant restrictions. Back then, fighting inflation by reducing demand could be effective. Changing the key rate does affect demand: investment and consumer demand decline. It seems to me that these methods are meant for another world—one that is gradually becoming smaller and smaller.

Dimitri Simes: And the last question—precisely about the world that perhaps still exists. We continue to think in the categories of the current world. It is well known that generals always prepare for the previous war. The conflict that everyone was preparing for in Ukraine differs substantially from what is actually happening. It seems to me that political scientists, statesmen, and society as a whole think as if what is happening today represents a long-term and most probable trend. But that is not always the case. This brings me to the thought of artificial intelligence. As you probably know, the physicist Stephen Hawking in the last year of his life warned that compared with the threats associated with artificial intelligence, all existing dangers may seem insignificant. You are a physicist and possess very disciplined thinking. Are we underestimating the danger of artificial intelligence?

Andrey Melnichenko: We do not know. Let us say it plainly: we do not know. But here is what seems to me. In moments of great uncertainty, when information flows and moods in society change rapidly, fear indeed becomes one of the instruments of consolidation. It makes it possible to ensure control over society, its stability, and its manageability. In my view, it would be far better to fear climate change. In the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, this process, launched by Margaret Thatcher, developed actively, rather than continuing to fear the Cold War and nuclear annihilation.

Dimitri Simes: But that was ignored.

Andrey Melnichenko: Why? For a time this direction developed actively—for roughly twenty years. Whether there is real substance behind it is another question. But the threat of annihilation as a result of a major nuclear war was replaced by another problem around which humanity tried to consolidate. It seems to me this is a positive process. Humanity needs a common enemy. One was found, but it turned out to be far safer.

Dimitri Simes: Maybe we should focus on artificial intelligence?

Andrey Melnichenko: After that we tried to focus on fighting diseases. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic. There was a lot that was unpleasant about it, but everyone was concerned and fighting a common threat. Then for a while people talked about aliens: we need to consolidate because we will be attacked from space. If society really must be consolidated, let humanity focus on some other danger, rather than on destroying Russians on the pretext that they will attack Europe, or on destroying someone else on the pretext of a possible attack on China. Let us focus on the problem of artificial intelligence. I like that much more than concentrating on the threat emanating from some state or person against whom some action must be taken because of a misunderstanding.

Dimitri Simes: I completely agree. I am not a physicist and I cannot judge what opportunities and, even more so, what dangers artificial intelligence presents. But I believe that this is an area where we have no right to underestimate either the opportunities or the risks. Thank you very much for this conversation. It was very interesting. Your position gives grounds for optimism: there are people with such an approach, and they are ready to listen to you even in godforsaken London. Thank you very much. We are going to a commercial break.

https://www.europeaninterest.eu/billionaire-entrepreneur-andrey-melnichenko-the-new-world-will-be-defined-by-sovereignty/

THE STATE AFTER THE EMPIRE

Viatcheslav Matuzov — Mon, 31 Aug 2026 22:43:21 +0000

Why the Middle East Cannot Be Rebuilt from the Outside

Viacheslav Matuzov
Arabist, former Soviet and Russian diplomat
President, Society of Friendship and Business Cooperation with Arab Countries

DIPLOMATIC STUDIES — BACKGROUNDER
International Order & Geopolitics

INTRODUCTION

I have been professionally involved with the Arab world for more than half a century. During that time I have seen governments rise and disappear, wars begin with one declared objective and end with another, alliances reverse themselves, revolutionary movements become governments and governments become exiles. I have watched the region from Beirut, Moscow and Washington, through diplomatic work, political contacts and direct relationships with people whose countries were repeatedly described from outside through concepts that often had very little to do with how those societies understood themselves.

This experience has convinced me of something that appears elementary but is repeatedly forgotten. The Middle East cannot be understood from the map alone. A state border tells us where jurisdiction formally ends. It does not tell us where historical memory ends, where religious authority ends, where tribal relationships end, where language ends, where economic dependence ends or where the consequences of an earlier empire end. The contemporary Arab state exists inside all of these systems simultaneously.

This is why so many external attempts to redesign the region have produced consequences different from those intended. The mistake has often begun before the intervention itself. It begins with the assumption that a state is essentially a political administration occupying a defined territory. Remove the wrong administration, introduce another constitutional arrangement, hold elections, reform institutions, and a different political order should emerge.

But a state is much more than its government.

It is an accumulated agreement, sometimes imperfect and sometimes coercive, among communities that have learned how to inhabit the same political space. Destroying the government can take days. Reconstructing that accumulated agreement may take generations.

The central lesson of the modern Middle East is therefore not simply that foreign intervention can fail. History has always contained successful and unsuccessful interventions. The deeper lesson is that political order cannot be engineered independently of the society from which it must derive its legitimacy.

THE BORDERS WERE NEW. THE SOCIETIES WERE NOT.

Much of the political geography of the contemporary Middle East emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the arrangements that followed the First World War. This fact is frequently repeated, sometimes so casually that it creates another misunderstanding: because many modern borders were comparatively recent, the societies inside them are imagined as artificial.

The reality is more complicated.

Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and the wider Arab East did not suddenly acquire history when modern borders appeared. Cities, religious communities, trading networks, families, linguistic traditions and systems of local authority existed long before the states that eventually incorporated them. The political map changed more quickly than society.

This distinction is fundamental.

A modern state can therefore be historically recent while containing extremely old social structures. When central authority weakens, these structures do not simply disappear with it. They can become more important.

A person whom an external observer identifies principally as an Iraqi or Syrian citizen may simultaneously understand himself through a city, tribe, religious community, family, profession and broader Arab or Islamic identity. Under normal conditions these affiliations can coexist. Under conditions of state collapse they can become alternative systems of security.

People do not become sectarian merely because analysts classify them by sect. They become politically dependent on sectarian, ethnic or tribal structures when the state ceases to perform functions that previously made those affiliations politically secondary.

This is why the destruction of state institutions can produce consequences that outsiders interpret incorrectly as the sudden return of “ancient hatreds.” The hatred may not be ancient at all. What has changed is the institutional environment.

When the state no longer protects you, you search for another structure that can.

THE STATE IS MORE THAN THE REGIME

One of the most consequential conceptual errors in Middle Eastern policy has been the failure to distinguish between regime and state.

A government can be authoritarian. Its leadership can be corrupt. Its security apparatus can commit abuses. Its political system can require reform. None of this means that the institutions through which millions of people conduct ordinary life have no value.

Ministries, municipalities, courts, schools, police, armed forces, public utilities and administrative systems contain accumulated relationships and professional knowledge. They also provide the population with predictable points of interaction.

When an external power decides that destroying a regime requires dismantling these institutions, it may discover that it has removed not only the political leadership but the infrastructure through which a replacement political order would have to operate.

Iraq provided one of the clearest demonstrations. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s government removed a dictatorship. But the subsequent dismantling of important parts of the Iraqi state, including the military and administrative apparatus, helped create a political and security vacuum whose consequences extended far beyond the original war.

Libya demonstrated another version of the same problem. Muammar Gaddafi disappeared, but the disappearance of the ruler did not automatically create a stronger Libyan state. Once the center collapsed, competing armed and regional structures acquired political significance.

The lesson should not be that every existing government must therefore be preserved indefinitely.

It is that the removal of a government and the preservation of a state are two different strategic operations.

Confusing them can transform political intervention into state destruction.

SYRIA AND THE LIMITS OF EXTERNAL DESIGN

The Syrian conflict became one of the most dramatic examples of the collision between external political models and internal social reality. From the beginning, different external actors interpreted Syria through their own strategic priorities. For some it was a struggle against authoritarian government. For others it became part of the regional competition involving Iran, Turkey, the Gulf states, Israel, Russia and the United States. For still others it was connected to Kurdish autonomy, political Islam, terrorism or the broader transformation produced by the Arab uprisings.

All of these dimensions existed.

The mistake was believing that any one of them explained Syria completely.

Syria was also a society whose communities had lived together within a particular state structure for decades. Sunnis, Alawites, Christians, Druze, Kurds and others did not simply constitute pieces on a geopolitical board. They had their own memories, fears and expectations about what the collapse of central authority could mean.

Once a conflict becomes existential for communities, the political logic changes. People no longer ask only which government they prefer. They ask who will protect them if the existing order disappears.

That question cannot be answered by constitutional theory alone.

This is one reason I have consistently regarded a purely military solution to the Syrian problem as insufficient. Military force can change the balance on the ground and can create conditions for negotiation. It cannot by itself reconstruct the political relationships required for different communities to inhabit one state after the fighting ends. My assessment during the Astana process was similarly that actors committed exclusively to a military outcome would have difficulty participating seriously in a settlement process.

A durable Syrian settlement therefore requires more than determining who controls Damascus.

It requires answering what Syria is as a political community.

PALESTINE IS NOT A REGIONAL DETAIL

For decades I have regarded the Palestinian question as one of the central political questions of the Middle East. This judgment does not mean that every conflict in the region is caused by Palestine. Clearly it is not. The Iran-Iraq War had its own causes. The Syrian conflict had its own causes. Conflicts in Yemen, Lebanon and Libya cannot simply be reduced to the Arab-Israeli confrontation.

The point is different.

The Palestinian question acquired a political and symbolic significance extending far beyond the territory directly involved. It became connected to the legitimacy of Arab governments, relations with the United States, political Islam, Arab nationalism, international law and the credibility of the international system itself.

During my professional life, the subject repeatedly appeared in Soviet and American contacts because both sides understood that it affected relationships throughout the region. I have described the Palestinian problem publicly as fundamentally political rather than religious. That distinction remains essential.

When a territorial and political conflict is transformed into an absolute religious confrontation, the space for compromise becomes dramatically smaller.

Territory can be divided.

Security arrangements can be negotiated.

Political recognition can be reciprocal.

Sacred truth cannot easily be partitioned.

Diplomacy should therefore resist every process that converts political conflicts into metaphysical ones.

RELIGION CANNOT BE REMOVED FROM POLITICS, BUT IT SHOULD NOT REPLACE IT

The Middle East cannot be understood without religion. Islam, Christianity and Judaism have shaped the region’s law, culture, historical memory and social organization for centuries. Any diplomatic analysis that treats religion merely as private belief will misunderstand political behavior.

But the opposite mistake is equally serious.

Religion should not become a universal explanation for political conflict.

Political movements use religious language. Governments use religious legitimacy. External powers build relationships with religious actors. Communities under threat can organize through religious institutions because those institutions survive when others fail.

The analyst must therefore ask a more precise question: when is religion producing political behavior, and when is political behavior using religion?

The difference can determine whether a conflict remains negotiable.

If two communities are fighting over security, territory or representation, institutional arrangements may be possible. If each becomes convinced that the other represents an existential theological enemy, ordinary diplomacy becomes substantially more difficult.

The professional responsibility of diplomacy is therefore to identify the material and political interests underneath ideological language whenever they exist.

THE OUTSIDE POWER ALWAYS SEES LESS

Every major power entering the Middle East arrives with intelligence services, diplomats, military specialists, economists and regional experts. Yet external powers repeatedly underestimate local consequences.

Why?

The problem is not simply insufficient information.

It is the difference between information and embedded knowledge.

A diplomatic report can explain which political party supports a government. It may not explain how a family in a particular town interprets that party through memories accumulated over three generations. Intelligence can identify the leadership of a religious organization. It may not fully capture the informal relationships through which authority actually operates inside a community.

Language matters enormously here.

To know Arabic is not simply to possess a technical instrument for translating words. Language reveals categories through which people describe dignity, obligation, humiliation, family, power and history. Translation can reproduce a sentence while losing the political meaning contained inside it.

This was one of the strengths of the older diplomatic school in which I was trained. Regional specialization was expected to be deep and long-term. A diplomat did not become an Arabist because he had spent two years in an embassy. The region became a professional field studied over decades.

Modern diplomacy increasingly values mobility, management and rapid rotation. These qualities have advantages. But they also carry a cost.

A diplomatic system that knows everything about today’s event and too little about the fifty years preceding it will repeatedly mistake symptoms for causes.

HUMILIATION IS A POLITICAL FACTOR

One of the least measurable variables in international relations is humiliation.

It does not appear easily in economic models or military balances. Yet it can determine political behavior for generations.

Societies remember occupations, lost wars, broken promises and unequal treatment. Whether every element of that memory corresponds perfectly to the archival record is politically secondary. Once humiliation becomes part of collective identity, political leaders must operate inside it.

This is particularly important in the Arab world, where the experience of European colonialism, the creation of the post-Ottoman order, Palestine, military interventions and unequal relationships with great powers have accumulated into a powerful historical narrative.

An external actor may believe it is proposing a rational arrangement.

The local society may experience the same proposal through the memory of previous domination.

Diplomacy that ignores this difference will repeatedly be surprised by resistance to solutions that appear materially advantageous.

Respect is therefore not diplomatic decoration.

It is a strategic resource.

NO REGION CAN BE GOVERNED PERMANENTLY FROM OUTSIDE

Great powers inevitably influence smaller states. This is a permanent reality of international politics. The Soviet Union did it. The United States did it. European powers did it before them. China, Russia, Turkey, Iran and the Gulf states all exercise influence today in different forms.

The relevant question is not whether external influence can be eliminated.

It cannot.

The question is whether external power attempts to substitute itself for internal political legitimacy.

That strategy eventually encounters a limit.

Military force can overthrow a government. Money can support an elite. Sanctions can damage an economy. Intelligence services can influence political actors. Diplomatic pressure can change calculations.

None of these instruments can indefinitely answer the fundamental question citizens ask of their own political order:

Why should we accept this system as ours?

Only societies themselves can ultimately answer that question.

THE REGION DOES NOT NEED ANOTHER MASTER PLAN

The history of the Middle East contains an extraordinary number of plans designed elsewhere: partitions, mandates, peace plans, regime-change strategies, democratization programmes, security architectures and proposals for a “new Middle East.”

Some produced useful results. Others failed catastrophically.

The recurring problem is the ambition to solve the region as though it were one strategic problem.

It is not.

There is no single Middle Eastern political system. Oman is not Lebanon. Saudi Arabia is not Syria. Egypt is not Iraq. Tunisia is not Yemen. Political Islam itself differs profoundly across societies. Even concepts such as tribe, sect and state have different meanings depending on local history.

External powers should therefore become more modest about architectural solutions.

Diplomacy should begin with political anthropology: who lives here, how do they understand themselves, what institutions do they trust, what do they fear, what historical experiences shape their behavior, and what arrangements have previously allowed them to coexist?

Only then should the geopolitical map be placed over the social one.

FIVE LESSONS FROM HALF A CENTURY OF THE MIDDLE EAST

First, preserve the state even when the government must change. Political reform and state destruction are fundamentally different processes. External policy should distinguish between institutions necessary for social continuity and institutions serving only the survival of a particular leadership.

Second, never reduce a society to one identity. Arab societies contain national, religious, local, tribal, professional and historical affiliations that overlap. Policies constructed around a single communal classification can strengthen divisions they claim merely to describe.

Third, keep political conflicts political wherever possible. Once territorial and security disputes become absolute religious or civilizational struggles, the space available to diplomacy contracts dramatically.

Fourth, regional knowledge must precede geopolitical design. Language, history and long professional experience are not secondary qualifications. They are instruments for preventing strategic error.

Fifth, no durable settlement can be imposed entirely from outside. External actors can mediate, guarantee, finance and sometimes compel. But the political order that survives must eventually become intelligible and legitimate to the society expected to live inside it.

CONCLUSION

After more than half a century of observing the Middle East, I am skeptical of explanations that promise one hidden key to the region. Oil does not explain everything. Religion does not explain everything. Colonial borders do not explain everything. American policy does not explain everything. Russian policy does not explain everything. Israel and Palestine do not explain everything.

But neither can any of these factors be understood in isolation.

The region is a historical system in which the consequences of empire, state formation, religion, external intervention, economic interests and collective memory continuously interact.

This complexity is sometimes treated as an obstacle to policy.

It should instead be the beginning of policy.

The greatest strategic mistakes occur when complexity is removed from analysis because it makes action inconvenient.

A map becomes easier to understand when we erase enough information from it. It also becomes less useful.

The Middle East does not require another external project promising to redesign it according to a perfect model. It requires diplomacy capable of recognizing that political order is accumulated historically and that societies cannot simply be reset.

Governments can be changed.

Borders can sometimes be changed.

Institutions can be reformed.

But societies carry their history with them.

The diplomat who forgets this may understand the balance of forces and still misunderstand the conflict.

The statesman who remembers it begins with a different question. He does not ask only:

What political order do we want to create?

He asks:

What political order can the people who must live inside it recognize as their own?

That is where diplomacy begins.

Too Little, Too Late, a Putin Oligarch Speaks Up

ID.PAGE — Sat, 11 Jul 2026 08:56:05 +0000

ttps://www.wsj.com/opinion/too-little-too-late-a-putin-oligarch-speaks-up-6acfd2b7July 11, 2026

The final battle of the Russian war with Ukraine will be fought in the corridors of the Kremlin.

“The Wizard of the Kremlin” is in theaters now, a fictionalized movie about onetime Putin propaganda aide Vladislav Surkov, whose layered ambiguities and deceits you may remember from the election-meddling era of 2016.

Much has changed. Mr. Surkov was last reported to be on the lam. Mr. Putin, meanwhile, has become surprisingly frank in signaling his wants and needs, however unrealistic they are. Four years ago, when he was pressing hopeless strategic adjustments on the U.S. and Europe, he was surprisingly candid about why: His illegal seizure of Crimea posed the risk of direct confrontation with NATO if Ukraine tried to reclaim its territory.

Voilà, today a NATO-backed Ukraine is using long-range strikes to make Russia’s hold on the peninsula increasingly tenuous.

This doesn’t bode well for the Putin machine’s latest signaling binge, in which it threatens war against NATO because of its role in prolonging Ukraine’s resistance. To what end?

Even if NATO failed to rise to the occasion in a Russian grab at Estonia or other vulnerable territory, as Mr. Putin might hope, the result wouldn’t be an end to Ukrainian resistance. It wouldn’t be an end to Ukraine’s strikes deep into Russia with Ukraine’s own weapons. The likelier result would be Germany, Poland, the U.K., the Baltics and perhaps others deciding, with more urgency and less restraint, on the importance of assisting Ukraine to hold off Russia.

If anybody knows Mr. Putin’s real ask behind his NATO threats, it’s Donald Trump, since the two talk. But it’s easy to guess, especially in light of some other recent news, which we’ll get to.

Mr. Putin wants an end to Ukrainian attacks on his domestic refineries, which cause him serious trouble with his subjects. He wants, if utterly hopelessly, the war shoved back into the box it once occupied, a war that Mr. Putin had grown comfortable that he could sustain indefinitely.

The problem is there’s no Venn-diagram solution to meet Mr. Putin’s needs that the West has any power or wish to deliver.

See the other big news of the week, or at least what the Economist magazine considers big news: a Putin-loyal oligarch, fertilizer kingpin Andrey Melnichenko, in its pages penning a plea for the West to bail out Russia on basically the terms Mr. Putin failed to sell four years ago before he fatally weakened himself with a misconceived war.

The Economist makes quite a fuss about the alleged opening here. Yet, for all the dark forebodings Mr. Melnichenko uses to sell his request, it only shows how behind-the-curve Mr. Putin and his allies remain in dealing with his situation.

The West is more united than ever behind Ukraine; if any schism exists, it’s only between those still open to a deal and those keen on further weakening Russia.

Donald Trump was the only vehicle for bridging the gap and strong-arming a compromise. Only Mr. Trump (aka a U.S. president) could supply the necessary superpower atmospherics, plus payola, plus security guarantees, to push a deal through the eye of a needle.

Now even Mr. Trump couldn’t do it. A ceasefire at present lines is the best Mr. Putin could get. Gone, if it ever existed, is the idea of Ukraine ceding additional unconquered terrain to Russia.

This realistic outcome is impossible for Mr. Putin, Mr. Melnichenko more or less admits. He goes on to suggest a lobby exists inside Russia to continue the war even in Mr. Putin’s absence, viewing the conflict as “existential” though he might more clearly specify whether he means existential for Russia or for the privileged positions of the lobbyists.

In fact, all evidence suggests there are also Russian nationalists who are capable of nursing continued revanchist aims against Ukraine while recognizing that the current war doesn’t serve Russia’s interests.

The problem always has been Mr. Putin. He must exit or the West must summon the will (and gall) to impose a settlement to prop him up at the expense of 40 million Ukrainians. Such an outcome was unrealistic four years ago when Mr. Putin first sought it. It maybe wasn’t unrealistic at the moment of peak Trump, with his triumphal return to the presidency in January 2025. Or maybe it was, however dear the idea of a Ukraine sellout to some still promoting Trump-Putin collusion theories.

But we’re in a different place now. The future rests on a stack of wild cards, importantly in the halls of the Kremlin itself. The West will keep supplying Ukraine. In every other way, events are in the saddle in a manner that should give nobody a particularly comfortable feeling.

Ценности Джимми Картера

Strangelove Associates — Fri, 5 Jun 2026 18:23:46 +0000

В воскресенье утром, всего через пять дней после своего 95-летия, Джимми Картер упал дома, готовясь к церкви. Он сильно ударился головой и оказался в больнице. Врачи наложили 14 швов на левый глаз. Его лицо прикрывал сын, а бровь покрыла повязка.
Команда осторожно спросила, не стоит ли переносить запланированное мероприятие в Нэшвилле.
Ответ Джимми Картера был кратким:
"Моим приоритетом было поехать в Нэшвилл, чтобы строить дома. "
В тот же вечер он вышел на сцену аудиториума Раймана в кепке Atlanta Braves, завязанном и битым лицом. Сотни добровольцев встретили его стоя. А на следующее утро он был на стройке.
В 95 лет.
С молотком в руке.
Это была не демонстрация. Это был настоящий Джимми Картер.
Джеймс Эрл Картер-младший родился 1 октября 1924 года в Плейнс Тауншипе, Джорджия. Его отец был фермером, а мать медсестрой. В 68 лет она присоединилась к Корпусу мира, потому что верила, что может принести пользу людям.
Вот где Джимми усвоил главный жизненный урок:
сервис - это не то, о чем говорят. Вот что они делают.
Служил в военно-морском флоте США, был сенатором штата Джорджия, губернатором Джорджии, с 1977 по 1981 год был 39-м президентом Соединенных Штатов Америки.
А потом покинул Белый дом.
И продолжал служить.
В 1984 году, через три года после окончания президентского срока, Картер взял молот и присоединился к Habitat for Humanity Может тогда он думал, что это будет разовая запись.
Но это стало делом его жизни.
Вместе со своей женой Розалинной он помогал строить и ремонтировать дома для людей, которые в этом нуждались. Год за годом. Страна за страной. Крыша к крыше.
В 2015 году, когда Джимми было 90 лет, врачи обнаружили у него агрессивную форму рака, которая уже распространилась на мозг.
Он пришел к журналистам с улыбкой и сказал, что прожил чудесную жизнь и готов принять любой результат.
И случилось чудо.
Лечение сработало.
В конце того же года обследования больше не показали признаков рака.
И он снова вернулся к строительству домов.
В 2019 году Картер сломал бедро. Я выздоровел. Снова на работу.
А потом было то воскресное утро, когда после падения и 14 швов он все равно пошел на свою миссию.
За десятилетия работы Джимми и Розалин Картер вместе со 100 000 добровольцами помогли построить, отремонтировать или восстановить более 4400 домов по всему миру.
Тысячи семей получили не просто крышу над головой.
У них есть дом.
Потому что человек, который занял высшую должность в своей стране, никогда не переставал приходить туда, где нужна помощь.
29 декабря 2024 года Джимми Картер скончался в своем доме в Плейнс, штат Джорджия в окружении семьи.
Ему было 100 лет.
Он стал самым долго действующим президентом в истории США.
Он не был идеальным. Идеальных людей не существует.
Но спустя более сорока лет после своего президентства он продолжал делать то, что считал правильным: подбирать молотки и помогать нуждающимся в доме.
Когда он был внизу, он был наверху.
Когда болеешь - обратно на работу.
Когда тело попросило остановиться, оно напомнило себе, что где-то есть люди, которые ждут помощи.
Некоторые люди говорят о своих ценностях.
Джимми Картер делал это...

«Fakers: A Top-Secret Tale of Phantoms and Forgeries on the Disinformation Front Line»

Andrey Matuzov — Fri, 5 Jun 2026 18:02:05 +0000

Автор: Рори Кормак (Rory Cormac)
Издательство: Oxford University Press
Дата выхода: Май 2026 года

Профессор международных отношений Ноттингемского университета Рори Кормак, признанный эксперт по истории британской разведки, выпустил исследование, которое заставляет совершенно иначе взглянуть на методы информационной войны Запада в XX веке. Книга основана на колоссальном массиве из восьми тысяч недавно рассекреченных документов из фондов Национального архива Великобритании и посвящена деятельности Департамента информационных исследований (Information Research Department, IRD) — глубоко засекреченной структуры, созданной британским правительством в начале Холодной войны.

Официально IRD должен был заниматься продвижением демократических ценностей и противодействием советской пропаганде. На деле же, как доказывает Кормак, эта организация превратилась в фабрику «черной» дезинформации и фальшивок мирового масштаба. Используя архивные шифры и внутреннюю переписку, автор шаг за шагом реконструирует самые грязные и изощренные операции британских спецслужб.

В центре повествования — механика создания так называемых «фантомов». IRD штамповал поддельные документы, якобы исходящие от советского руководства, министерств или компартий третьих стран, чтобы спровоцировать внутренние расколы в соцблоке и дискредитировать Москву на международной арене. Кормак подробно описывает, как британские оперативники фабриковали фальшивые приказы, липовые манифесты национально-освободительных движений и даже засылали своих агентов, переодетых в хиппи, на всемирные фестивали молодежи и студентов для ведения подрывной работы изнутри.

Главная ценность исследования Кормака заключается в том, что он уходит от привычных штампов о «джентльменских» методах МИ-6. Автор показывает циничный, системный и технологичный подход к искажению реальности, где поддельный бланк или вовремя запущенная в прессу фальшивка ценились выше, чем классический шпионаж. Книга предлагает детальную анатомию того, как зарождались современные государственные инструменты манипуляции общественным мнением, и демонстрирует, что нынешние информационные войны — это лишь прямое продолжение секретных протоколов середины прошлого века.

Артамонов: Судьба Израиля

Andrey Matuzov — Sun, 31 May 2026 20:23:19 +0000

"Новая война и что нам делать". Доклад Безрукова о рецепте победы России

Viatcheslav Matuzov — Sun, 31 May 2026 15:28:45 +0000

Ветеран СВР и член президиума Совета по внешней и оборонной политике Андрей Безруков на недавнем заседании СВОП сделал доклад, который, как говорят очевидцы, впечатлил самого главу МИД Сергея Лаврова. Приведу основную его часть.

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Стратегия противника

В условиях российского ядерного превосходства руководители западных стран стараются удержать конфликт с Россией от превращения в открытое столкновение, в котором у нашей страны не останется другого выхода, кроме как применить ядерное оружие. Они рассчитывают, что в процессе «перманентной войны» у России станет накапливаться усталость и будут истощаться ресурсы, что в условиях слабеющей экономики и отставания в технологиях приведет к надрыву и внутреннему коллапсу. Они ожидают, что после 2028 г. Россия опять войдет в «демографическую яму», что отразится на возможностях Вооружённых сил.

Их подход – комбинация стратегии «волчьей стаи» (создание проблем на наших границах, отвлекающих наши ресурсы и внимание через натравливание на нас сателлитов) и стратегии «тысячи порезов» – атак дронов, блокады торговых путей, подрывов танкеров, громких терактов и убийств.

Одновременно, Запад тянет время, запускает противоречивую информацию о своих намерениях и разыгрывает и с Россией, и с Ираном традиционную игру в «хорошего и плохого полицейского». В то время, как Европа и Израиль берут на себя амплуа сорвавшихся с цепи поджигателей войны, Соединённые Штаты изображают переговоры, предлагая «морковку» соглашений, которые никто не сможет и не захочет выполнять.

На Западе при всех имеющихся там разночтениях исходят из следующего: чем дольше продолжается война на Украине, тем больше у них времени для мобилизации своего военно-промышленного потенциала и подготовки удара по России на новом концептуальном и технологическом уровне.

Вызовы новой войны для России

Нейтрализация ядерных сил

Главным сдерживающим фактором для Запада является наш ядерный потенциал. Его эффективность пока принимается как постулат. Однако, в ближайшие годы противник, в первую очередь, США, будет отрабатывать два основных пути «обнуления» российских ядерных сил.

Первый – через развёртывание в космосе системы мониторинга и уничтожения российских ракет на всех участках траектории полёта. По прошествии четырёх десятилетий цель проекта «звёздных войн» начинает становиться технологически достижимой.

Второй – уничтожение центров принятия решений и носителей ядерного оружия – баз подводных лодок, аэродромов, пусковых шахт – посредством координированного внезапного удара с использованием тайно накопленных на территории России беспилотных средств поражения и диверсионно-разведывательных групп. Прототипом служит британско-украинская операция «Паутина». Завезти в страну через свою агентуру подобные устройства – задача гораздо менее сложная, чем создать космический зонтик.

Уничтожение критической инфраструктуры и человеческого потенциала

Военные действия последних лет показали, что существующая критическая инфраструктура имеет мало шансов выжить в войне, где дроны пролетают тысячи километров и наводятся с сантиметровой точностью. Более того, такими возможностями уже обладают не только государства, но и преступные картели и террористические группы. Однако ещё до перехода в военную фазу противник делает всё, чтобы подорвать российскую способность строить, совершенствовать и восстанавливать инфраструктуру – через запрет на ввоз оборудования, ограничение финансовых ресурсов, технологический саботаж.

Для убийства людей подоспел целый набор новых средств-устройств от дронов до «невинной» домашней электроники и телефонов, способных выследить человека повсюду и нанести фатальный удар взрывчаткой, ядом, током, или чем-то ещё, что будет создано в ближайшие годы.

Уничтожение Израилем иранских военных и учёных опиралось на контроль телекоммуникационной инфраструктуры, в которую американскими и китайскими создателями её основных технологий были заложены возможности, о которых можно только догадываться. Все мобильные телефоны, роутеры, телекоммуникационные вышки и камеры наблюдения могут контролироваться извне, что вкупе с возможностями анализа массивов постоянно собираемых данных, делает заложником каждого человека, особенно обладающего ценностью для противника.

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Комплексная атака на системы управления

Соединённые Штаты прилагают особые усилия для разработки новых методов и технологий в сфере разведки и управления на базе искусственного интеллекта, которые дают возможность мгновенно обрабатывать информацию из всех доступных источников и руководить комплексными, гибридными операциями в реальном времени, предвосхищая возможные действия оппонентов. Упор делается на внезапность и обман противника, отвлечение его внимания с целью нарушить процесс принятия решений, направить по ложному пути.

Противник считает, что жёсткая вертикаль принятия решений в России может быть перегружена необходимостью реагировать на большое количество проблем, одновременно возникающих в разных сферах, что приведет к параличу принятия решений и коллапсу управления. На фоне несогласованности и безынициативности, которые мы видим в разных министерствах и ведомствах, его трудно обвинить в отсутствии логики.

Во время внезапной атаки, которая как в Иране, может произойти в ходе интенсивных переговоров, вероятно нанесение киберудара по нашим системам связи и критической инфраструктуры, в которых враг за долгие годы, несомненно, создал много вредоносных закладок и «задних дверей». Разрабатываемые в США системы на основе искусственного интеллекта уже показали уникальные способности выявлять и использовать уязвимые места в критической инфраструктуре. В медиапространстве и социальных сетях в это время будут создавать альтернативную реальность вакуума власти, пытаясь парализовать экономику и вызвать панику.

Очевидно, что в момент атаки активируется диверсионная агентура, находящаяся на нелегальном положении, а также завербованные через социальные сети глупцы и отщепенцы, которые отправятся взрывать, поджигать и убивать. Имеется расчёт и на то, что внутри России ввиду значительной миграции из стран Центральной Азии существует ментально инородная, мотивированная деньгами группа населения, которая, как афганские мигранты в Иране, может стать объектом вербовки и расходным материалом для удара изнутри.

Биовойна и биотерроризм

В ближайшие годы мы столкнемся и с еще более сложным вызовом – биологической войной. Если появившееся более ста лет назад химическое оружие ввиду его неизбирательности не получило широкого применения, то биологическое оружие (с учётом огромного прогресса в генетике) сможет применяться направлено – против отдельной этнической группы, расы, генетического типа, людей принимающих отдельные препараты и так далее. Оно может быть нацелено не только на человеческую популяцию, но и на медленный, не сразу заметный подрыв сельского хозяйства и экосистем конкурентов.

В отличие от ядерного оружия, международный контроль над разработкой смертоносных вирусов и бактерий, особенно если она ведется под эгидой какого-либо государства, практически невозможен. Более того, смертоносные вирусы могут быть созданы даже одиночкой, обладающим необходимыми навыками и оборудованием. Пандемия ковида показала уязвимость человека к модифицированным, неизвестным ранее вирусам и слабую готовность общества к борьбе с ними. Биолаборатории, которые США понастроили вокруг России, попытки сбора генетической информации в нашей стране, не оставляют сомнений в намерениях противника.

Что нам делать?

Принять войну как новую нормальность

Мировая война уже идёт, где-то «ползучая», а вокруг нас – открытая. Целесообразно исходить из того, что худшее впереди. В статье, написанной более десяти лет назад, я поднимал вопрос о необходимости нового взгляда на обороноспособность страны как системную устойчивость ко всем видам атак, где военные угрозы – лишь часть целого спектра проблем, которые могут создать наши противники. Сейчас, десять лет спустя, мы ещё более остро нуждаемся в широком стратегическом диалоге о том, какой становится новая война и что несут новые технологии.

Как утверждают в «РЭНД Корпорейшн», война становится перманентной и растянется на десятилетия. Вне зависимости от того, затронет ли она Россию напрямую, как сейчас, или заденет по касательной, перекинувшись на другие регионы, не одно поколение россиян станет участниками или свидетелями величайшего передела мира. Поэтому нужно искать способы, как с войной ЖИТЬ. Как бы тревожно это ни звучало для каждого из нас лично, следующие декаду – две мы будем «воюющим обществом». Существовать в реальности войны – значит не «выживать», а продолжать идти вперёд, но строить страну и будущее по-другому. Развитие нашей экономики, человеческого капитала, управленческих институтов должно, во-первых, учитывать завтрашнюю реальность, а, во-вторых, работать на победу – в широком смысле этого понятия.

Рассчитывать, что всё скоро закончится и можно будет вернуться к жизни по-старому, – обманывать себя. После четырёх с половиной лет украинского конфликта пора перейти на военные рельсы организационно, а главное – ментально.

Переосмыслить системы управления

Без осознания и принятия новой реальности, перестройки мышления, невозможно подготовить Россию к новым вызовам, выстроить такую систему управления, которая способна «думать вперед», работать на упреждение, перехватывать инициативу, навязывать противникам свою игру.

Если критериями успеха в долгой войне на измор являются

способность выдерживать многочисленные удары, не теряя управляемости,
гибкость реагирования,
инициатива и наступательность, то пересборка системы управления требует с одной стороны, сильного высшего управляющего и координирующего органа – СТАВКИ, а с другой – децентрализации и делегирования ответственности, опирающихся на инициативу и самокоординацию снизу. Само собой разумеется, что такая система будет работать только при наличии доверии друг другу, с опорой на людей, для которых служение Родине выше личных и ведомственных интересов.

Долгая война требует другой экономической модели, способной обеспечить устойчивость страны и её обороноспособность в период технологической революции. Постулаты такой модели вытекают как из нашего, так и мирового опыта.

Это ускоренный экономический рост, опирающийся, с одной стороны, на плановое развитие ключевых отраслей с задачей обеспечения суверенитета в важнейших для страны технологических сферах, а с другой – на максимальную поддержку частного инновационного предпринимательства через радикальную дебюрократизацию и отмену тормозящих инициативу законов.

Это суверенный рубль, опирающийся на внутреннее богатство России, динамичный внутренний рынок капитала и двухконтурная финансовая система, способная обеспечить финансирование крупных прорывных технологических и инфраструктурных проектов и держать под контролем инфляцию. Пора понять, что финансовая система Запада — вражеская система и разрыв с ней неизбежен. Мир на наших глазах уже распадается на несколько конкурирующих экономикотехнологических пространств, живущих по собственным правилам.

К сожалению, перестройка мышления, способность увидеть себя и мир «новыми глазами» – болезненный, сложный процесс. Людям хочется простых и быстрых решений, институты власти с трудом принимают перемены, а у существующих экономических моделей и кадровых решений есть влиятельные защитники.

Перестроить критическую инфраструктуру

Опыт идущих войн диктует новый подход к строительству критической физической и информационной инфраструктуры. Нефтехранилища, насосные, электрогенерирующие и распределительные мощности и дата-центры должны быть заглублены под землю или строиться в укреплённом контуре, как это делается с ядерными энергоблоками. Транспортной и энергетической инфраструктуре необходим сетевой, распределённый принцип без сосредоточения в крупных узлах. То же относится к уникальным производствам, которые, кроме того, должны быть дублированы в другом, желательно удалённом регионе. Строительные нормативы должны предполагать создание убежищ в подвальных помещениях, как это было в СССР и как это сейчас делается в Израиле.

Что касается критической информационной инфраструктуры, для обеспечения приемлемого уровня безопасности потребуется полная замена иностранного коммуникационного оборудования и программного обеспечения в ключевых системах, строительство полностью отечественной ИТ-инфраструктуры. Должен быть завершён переход на отечественные операционные системы, построенные по принципу «доверенности» (secure by design). Это потребует времени, но уже сейчас можно сфокусироваться на обеспечении суверенного контроля важнейших узлов и каналов.

Угроза эпидемий и биологического оружия заставляет не только радикально пересмотреть систему санитарно-эпидемиологического мониторинга, но и поставит вопрос рассредоточения населения из мегаполисов, перехода к малоэтажному строительству, более равномерного расселения по территории страны.

Мир, где доминируют дроны, скорее всего потребует «тотальной», мультитехнологичной противовоздушной обороны с сетью радаров наземного и воздушного базирования по периметру границ и вокруг стратегических объектов. Очевидно, что сложность комплексной защиты инфраструктуры потребует убрать чересполосицу ответственных и создать специализированное ведомство по её физической и информационной защите, что американцы сделали уже несколько лет назад.

Будет ли эти меры затратными? Несомненно. Но, как мы убедились на своем горьком опыте, цена потери стратегического бомбардировщика или завода по производству оптоволокна не идёт ни в какое сравнение со стоимостью железобетонного укрытия или радара, подвешенного на дирижабле. Еще менее приемлем риск того, что в определённый момент «обвалятся» системы связи, передачи энергии, остановится транспорт, или новая пандемия выкосит миллионы жизней в наших мегаполисах, где карантинные меры не будут работать.

С точки зрения будущего России, затраты превращаются в инвестиции, которые в любом случае придётся осуществить. В начале нового технологического цикла всё равно придётся создавать новую инфраструктуру, а её строительство даст мультипликативный эффект роста. Для обеспечения народосбережения, улучшения качества жизни и повышения рождаемости так или иначе потребуется расселение из «человейников» в мегаполисах в более комфортные, малоэтажные поселения.

Государству, даже не учитывая риски войны, необходимо ускоренными темпами развивать Сибирь и Дальний Восток, выстраивать инфраструктурную связанность страны, переводить энергетику, транспорт и связь на новые технологии. Всё равно надо решать проблему технологического суверенитета и конкурентоспособности – формировать стратегический долгосрочный госзаказ, который будет стимулировать рост российских компаний.

Интегрировать армию и общество

Многомерная война, в которой воюет вся страна, вкупе с явным трендом на взаимопроникновение военных и гражданских технологий диктует необходимость радикального пересмотра вопроса о том, что есть армия, а также отношений армии и общества. Реальность войны размывает барьер между Вооружёнными силами и остальным населением, существовавший во времена Клаузевица. Необходимость решать вопросы, назревшие «на земле», заставляет людей по обе стороны бывшего барьера брать на себя риски нарушения установленных традиций и даже законов. Если на Украине, ввиду общей слабости госструктур, относительно молодым руководителям проще искать решения ad-hoc, то в России поиск новых форм взаимодействия до сих пор болезненный процесс. Это усугубляется и нашей исторической традицией, в которой военное образование отделено от гражданского, а карьера офицера проходит «за забором».

Ещё раз сошлюсь на статью десятилетней давности:

«Вооружённые силы должны вписаться в будущую комплексную систему обороны, в рамках которой предстоит выстраивать взаимодействие с невоенными элементами. Создание всех компетенций для многомерной войны в рамках самих Вооружённых сил не имеет смысла – придётся плодить структуры, которые будут дублировать уже существующие государственные ведомства или частные компании. Для этого не хватит ни людей, ни денег.

Решение проблемы – в глубокой интеграции Вооружённых сил и всего остального общества, в двойном предназначении многих структур. В нахождении таких путей переплетения военных и гражданских ресурсов и навыков, которые обеспечили бы ответы на вызовы безопасности, сохраняя издержки для общества на приемлемом уровне. Это предполагает включение в систему многомерной обороны научных, инженерных и медийных элит. Армия становится чуть более “гражданской”, а гражданские ведомства – чуть более “военными”. То есть армия должна максимально влиться в общество, а общество – осознать себя армией. Во многих областях специалисты будут, являясь гражданскими, исполнять дополнительные оборонные функции, получая за это компенсацию. Именно применение всего спектра средств, способность совместных действий является залогом успеха».

Мы уже видим, как процесс интеграции военного и гражданского происходит спонтанно, «снизу», в таких секторах, как космос, беспилотные и информационные технологии. Ozon и Wildberries дополняют военную логистику. Однако, в этом процессе мы систематически сталкиваемся с тем, что что военные разработки, закупки и производство администрируются настолько специфическим путем, что пора подумать, как, сохраняя режим секретности, придать всем процессам требуемую обстоятельствами гибкость, как обеспечить быстрый переток технологий и кадров между гражданским и военным секторами, как лучше вписать военную науку и экономику в контекст технологического развития.

Более того, сейчас, когда прорывные технологические решения для обороны могут возникать вне контура ВПК и быстро устаревать, следует разобраться, какие секреты надо охранять, а какими, наоборот, обязательно делиться. Если мы хотим привлекать талантливую молодежь в военные разработки, пора задуматься, как вместо «закручивания гаек», сделать упор на повышение качества кадровой и агентурной работы.

Инвестировать в разведку и контрразведку

Информационная и агентурная работа выходит на первый план в современной войне, обеспечивая преимущества на внешнем контуре и контроль на внутреннем. Качество её организации становится важнейшим фактором успеха. Непосредственно на фронте эффективность военных действий полностью зависит от владения обстановкой и целеуказания. В стратегическом плане – без способности правильно осознать ситуацию и планы противника, без бесшовного процесса принятия решений не будет возможности владеть инициативой, навязывать свою игру. Следующие годы потребуют значительного увеличения внимания руководства страны к спецслужбам и инвестиций в их деятельность.

С точки зрения технологий, предстоит выстроить системы разведки и управления, которые в глобальном масштабе и в реальном времени могли бы интегрировать все информационные потоки, от интернета и космоса до агентурных сетей, позволяющие принимать решения в упреждающем режиме.

Однако главным в разведке и контрразведке всегда был и будет человеческий фактор. Без тщательного отбора, бескомпромиссной требовательности, внимания к личному и профессиональному росту каждого сотрудника, без создания особой чекистской культуры спецслужбы не будут отличаться от других бюрократий, использующих власть для решения собственных проблем.

Планы противника по подрыву России изнутри требуют особого внимания к выстраиванию агентурной работы «на земле». Это прежде всего возрождение плотной сети участковых, радикальное увеличение их денежного довольствия, резкое сокращение «бумажных» отчетов, фокусировка на работе с добровольными помощниками и агентурой в группах населения, подверженных влиянию противника, в том числе в диаспорах мигрантов.

Нельзя ждать, пока в соседних с Россией странах сформируются базы наших врагов, из которых по нам будут наносить удары. Необходимо заранее организовывать сторонников, активно привлекать на свою сторону элиты, молодежь, потенциальных лидеров. Как писал ранее, в условиях, когда противник использует террористические методы, «встаёт задача дезорганизации противника, ликвидации угроз в любой точке мира. Следует действовать превентивно, покупать тех, кто продаётся, и устранять тех, кто не останавливается после предупреждения». Для этого государство должно иметь все необходимые рычаги воздействия, такие как созданная легендарным руководителем нелегальной разведки КГБ СССР Ю.И. Дроздовым группа «Вымпел».

Перестать пытаться понравиться

Одна из главных проблем в отношениях России с нашими противниками – то, что нас перестали бояться. Наше поведение в последние годы убедило их, что Россия осознаёт свою внутреннюю слабость и поэтому не решится на обострение. В головах «победителей в холодной войне» с девяностых годов прочно укоренились три тезиса, на которых строится вся западная политика:

Россия будет и дальше слабеть,
российские элиты можно расколоть,
Россия и Китай не выступят одним фронтом.

Рискну утверждать: если бы наша страна в последние десять – пятнадцать лет показала устойчивый экономический рост, Запад не решился бы перевести конкуренцию за Украину в военную плоскость. Многие европейские страны, в частности, Германия и Франция, предпочли бы встать в очередь за бизнесом.

С начала украинского конфликта наши заявления про «красные линии» при отсутствии адекватного ответа на систематическую эскалацию только укрепили Запад во мнении, что у России нет адекватного ресурса для ответа, а в российской власти нет единства. Это, в их глазах, подтверждают продолжающиеся попытки договариваться с Трампом даже при отсутствии встречных действий с американской стороны. В стане врагов никого не трогают аргументы, что Россия ограничивает себя в средствах ведения войны по моральным соображениям, тем более что действия Израиля и США сняло все существовавшие табу.

Западные, прежде всего, британские спецслужбы, за время конфликта выстроили стратегию нарастающих в масштабе провокаций террористического характера. Некоторые из них делаются руками Украины, иные, как подрыв «Северного потока», напрямую. Перед лицом этих провокационных шагов мы занимаем оборонительную позицию, продолжая отдавать инициативу. Без адекватного ответа их стратегия приведет к повышению ставок для российской власти на недопустимый, экзистенциональный уровень, особенно если вдруг будут использованы ядерные или биологические вещества.

Чтобы потерять желание устраивать «суперпровокации», противник сам должен почувствовать себя заложником. В числе наиболее уязвимых мест, как показал опыт иранской войны, находятся суда-газовозы, газоприемные терминалы, частные спутниковые группировки и дата-центры западных финансовых компаний. В первую очередь пострадать должны те, кто направляет и финансирует агрессивность Запада, – конфронтация с Россией должна стать крайне невыгодным проектом.

Хищники рациональны по своей природе и избегают конфликта с сильными. Их планы рушатся при потере инициативы и свободы рук. Глядя на то, как Европой воспринято жёсткое сопротивление Ирана и как исчезла из американских нарративов тема «страшного северокорейского режима» после обретения им способности нанести США реальный ущерб, нам пора перестать казаться «хорошими». Следует начать «угрожать угрожающим», приняв на вооружение в дополнение к концепции «гарантированного взаимного уничтожения» на ядерном уровне концепцию «нанесения неприемлемого ущерба» на неядерном. Как говорится, «с волками жить – по-волчьи выть». Войны ведутся за победу, а победитель напишет историю.

Источник

Конфликт на БВ

Andrey Matuzov — Tue, 26 May 2026 05:34:44 +0000

Делаю апдейт на 08:20 МСК.

Короткий вывод

К этому часу картина стала хуже для быстрой сделки, но ещё не перешла в новую большую фазу войны. Главные изменения за ночь — это новые американские “оборонительные” удары по югу Ирана, жёсткое заявление Рубио, что Ормуз должен быть открыт “так или иначе”, и одновременно — резкое ужесточение израильской линии по Ливану, где Нетаньяху уже говорит о наращивании ударов по “Хезболле”. Это означает: переговорное окно в Дохе ещё не закрыто, но оно стало значительно уже и более хрупким.

Что изменилось за ночь

Самый важный сдвиг — Вашингтон перестал делать вид, что соглашение вот‑вот будет готово. Reuters пишет, что Марко Рубио уже говорит не о часах, а о том, что сделка с Ираном может занять ещё несколько дней. Это прозвучало после свежих американских “defensive” strikes по югу Ирана — по лодкам и ракетным пусковым позициям, которые США объясняют защитой своих сил и попыткой обеспечить проход через Ормуз.

Иран в ответ заявил, что сбил враждебный американский беспилотник. Reuters передаёт это как иранское утверждение, а также пишет, что переговоры в Дохе продолжаются вокруг трёх ключевых тем: открытие Ормуза, ядерный вопрос и разморозка иранских средств. Это важно, потому что показывает: вместо “одной большой сделки” формируется тяжёлый пакет из нескольких конфликтных файлов, и ни один из них ещё не закрыт.

По Ормузу тон США стал ещё жёстче. Рубио прямо сказал, что пролив должен быть открыт “one way or the other”. Это одна из самых сильных публичных формулировок Вашингтона за последние дни: США фактически дают понять, что не готовы принимать длительный иранский контроль над проливом как новую норму.

Рынки эту комбинацию прочитали как снижение шансов на быстрый мир. Reuters пишет, что после новых американских ударов нефть снова пошла вверх, а оптимизм по быстрой сделке ослаб. Brent поднимался выше $98 за баррель, а инвесторы вернулись в режим осторожности.

Ливан / Израиль

Самый опасный сдвиг ночи — по Ливану. Reuters прямо пишет, что Нетаньяху заявил: Израиль будет усиливать удары по “Хезболле”. По материалу Reuters, Израиль и “Хезболла” продолжают обмениваться ударами несмотря на перемирие от 16 апреля, а само израильское руководство теперь открыто связывает своё право на дальнейшие действия с необходимостью сохранить свободу манёвра на всех фронтах, включая Ливан.

По Reuters, с момента того перемирия “Хезболла” продолжала атаки дронами и ракетами; Израиль утверждает, что с тех пор от этих ударов погибли как минимум 11 израильских солдат, а израильские удары в Ливане за тот же период убили не менее 608 человек. Reuters также пишет, что израильская авиация уже била по Бекаа, а после нового заявления Нетаньяху жители южных пригородов Бейрута начали опасаться возвращения более широкой ударной кампании.

Самый важный вывод здесь: именно Ливан сейчас становится главным спойлером всей американо‑иранской дипломатии. Даже если Доха даст промежуточную формулу по Ормузу, израильская линия по “Хезболле” может не дать этой формуле стабилизировать регион целиком. Это уже не гипотеза “на будущее”, а почти открыто сформулированная израильская позиция.

Что это значит на 08:20

Если смотреть трезво, то на этот час мы имеем не срыв переговоров, а их резкое ужесточение. США показывают, что готовы бить и параллельно вести диалог. Иран показывает, что не отказывается от диалога, но будет отвечать и не хочет входить в сделку с позиции слабости. Израиль, в свою очередь, даёт понять, что не собирается автоматически подчинять ливанский фронт логике американо‑иранской разрядки.

Что подтверждено, а что нет

Подтверждено:
США нанесли новые “оборонительные” удары по югу Ирана.
Рубио сказал, что сделка может занять ещё несколько дней.
Рубио также сказал, что Ормуз должен быть открыт “one way or the other”.
Нетаньяху заявил, что Израиль усилит удары по “Хезболле” в Ливане.

Не подтверждено окончательно:
что США и Иран почти согласовали финальный документ; Reuters и AP говорят скорее о продолжающихся переговорах и о том, что разногласия сохраняются.
что Иран действительно согласился на американскую трактовку полного открытия Ормуза и окончательной ядерной уступки; по доступной картине это не подтверждено.
что Израиль уже принял решение о возвращении к массированным ударам по Бейруту; пока подтверждено именно намерение усилить удары и тревога на ливанской стороне, но не новый большой raid по столице.

Ближайший прогноз

На горизонте сегодняшнего дня наиболее вероятен сценарий без сделки, но с продолжением интенсивных контактов. Вероятность — примерно 60–70%.
Вероятность узкого промежуточного рамочного документа — 20–30%.
Вероятность, что главный срыв сегодня придёт не из Дохи, а из Ливана, я бы оценил как выше, чем риск немедленного американо‑иранского обвала: примерно 25–35% для серьёзного ухудшения ливанского трека против 10–15% для новой широкой американо‑иранской ударной фазы уже в ближайшие часы. Основание — именно новая израильская риторика и продолжающийся обмен ударами с “Хезболлой”.

That’s why this missile is getting global attention.

ID.PAGE — Sat, 23 May 2026 21:13:51 +0000